Year: 2013
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Quote of the Day: Cindy Cohn and Mark M. Jaycox
“It’s time for those in government who want to rebuild the trust of the American people and others all over the world to come clean and take some actual steps to rein in the NSA.” -
The Hyper-bolic-loop
[The start of Dr. Drang’s analysis](http://www.leancrew.com/all-this/2013/08/hyperloop/):
> I’m no billionaire industrialist, and I don’t pretend to know anything about the Kantrowitz limit, but I do know about some of the topics touched on in the Hyperloop proposal, and since I’m paying for this blog, I might as well use it.
And the end:
> I’m not saying that the problems with Hyperloop can’t be solved. Money, time, and talent can solve any problem that doesn’t involve breaking physical laws, but I wouldn’t put my money, time, or talent in the hands of someone who takes me for a fool.
The stuff in between those two statements are pure gold. I actually didn’t read anything about the Hyperloop — it sounded stupid to me — but man did I love this from Dr. Drang.
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‘Cameron Proves Greenwald Right’
[Andrew Sullivan writing about][1] the [detainment of Glenn Greenwald’s spouse][2] (as a terrorist) as he passed through London:
> In this respect, I can say this to David Cameron. Thank you for clearing the air on these matters of surveillance. You have now demonstrated beyond any reasonable doubt that these anti-terror provisions are capable of rank abuse. Unless some other facts emerge, there is really no difference in kind between you and Vladimir Putin. You have used police powers granted for anti-terrorism and deployed them to target and intimidate journalists deemed enemies of the state.
I link to Sullivan’s post instead of all the “news” coverage elsewhere because it brings up a lot of great points. Sullivan has been far more accepting of Greenwald and Snowden’s revelations than I have, but this was the straw that broke the proverbial camels back for Sullivan.
[1]: http://dish.andrewsullivan.com/2013/08/18/cameron-proves-greenwald-right/
[2]: http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/aug/18/david-miranda-detained-uk-nsa -
Elementary OS
[Cassidy James, writing about the motivation behind Elementary OS][1]:
> In April of 2011, a small group of high school and college kids released an Ubuntu 10.10 remaster that we called elementary OS “Jupiter”. And for us, it was huge. It was a demonstration of a desire to create a Linux-based OS that championed consistency and great design. It featured several home-grown apps and heavy patches to the UI of others.
Their latest beta, “Luna”, is simply fantastic. I was turned on to this from [Keith][2] [Smiley][3] and I am glad he pointed this OS out. What the Elementary team is creating is a gorgeous version of Linux. I downloaded and installed this in Parallels and it is really nice. It’s pretty, it’s clean, it’s useable.
I also like that they are operating off of the pay-what-you-want model instead of just shipping it for free (though it can be had for free, which is what I did as I only wanted to check it out quickly — if I do install it on a machine permanently I will pay for it).
In addition to Elementary OS, Ubuntu 13.04 looks really great and boasts a lot of great encryption out of the box. I don’t think either OS is *better* than OS X, but both are good alternatives and worth checking in on here and there. Linux is getting closer, that much is clear — so close that I am tempted to get an 11″ Air just to run these two variations of Linux on.
If nothing else, [the site][4] is worth checking out.
[1]: http://elementaryos.org/journal/the-road-to-luna?utm_medium=App.net&utm_source=PourOver
[2]: https://alpha.app.net/smileykeith/post/9128637
[3]: https://alpha.app.net/smileykeith/post/9128686
[4]: http://elementaryos.org -
NSA Compliance
[Carol D. Leonnig reporting on the rather obvious][1]:
> “The FISC is forced to rely upon the accuracy of the information that is provided to the Court,” its chief, U.S. District Judge Reggie B. Walton, said in a written statement to The Washington Post. “The FISC does not have the capacity to investigate issues of noncompliance, and in that respect the FISC is in the same position as any other court when it comes to enforcing [government]() compliance with its orders.”
President Obama on August 9th, 2013, [transcript from The Washington Post][3]:
> What you’re hearing about is the prospect that these could be abused. Now part of the reason they’re not abused is because they’re — these checks are in place, and those abuses would be against the law and would be against the orders of the FISC.
Now [here’s a report from The Washington Post’s Barton Gellman][4] (posted last night):
> The [NSA audit obtained by The Post][5], dated May 2012, counted 2,776 incidents in the preceding 12 months of unauthorized collection, storage, access to or distribution of legally protected communications. Most were unintended. Many involved failures of due diligence or violations of standard operating procedure. The most serious incidents included a violation of a court order and unauthorized use of data about more than 3,000 Americans and green-card holders.
It’s hard to fathom just how bad that is, but consider these other tidbits from Gellman’s article:
> One in 10 incidents is attributed to a typographical error in which an analyst enters an incorrect query and retrieves data about U.S phone calls or e-mails.
That’s both funny and disturbing. What isn’t funny at all is the fact that the NSA created a massive dragnet that they ran for months without court approval. Then when the court heard the arguments:
> James R. Clapper Jr., the director of national intelligence, has acknowledged that the court found the NSA in breach of the Fourth Amendment, which prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures, but the Obama administration has fought a Freedom of Information lawsuit that seeks the opinion.
And yet politicians adamantly defend the NSA and its programs, or are barred by “national security” from saying anything about them. You either agree, or you shut the fuck up. *Democracy.*
> In one required tutorial, NSA collectors and analysts are taught to fill out oversight forms without giving “extraneous information” to “our FAA overseers.”
Either President Obama didn’t know about this report and these violations, and thus the biggest spy agency on the planet is lying to him, or the President is lying to the people that elected him. Quite honestly, I hope it is the latter.
[1]: http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/court-ability-to-police-us-spying-program-limited/2013/08/15/4a8c8c44-05cd-11e3-a07f-49ddc7417125_story.html
[3]: http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/transcript-president-obamas-august-9-2013-news-conference-at-the-white-house/2013/08/09/5a6c21e8-011c-11e3-9a3e-916de805f65d_story_4.html
[4]: http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-broke-privacy-rules-thousands-of-times-per-year-audit-finds/2013/08/15/3310e554-05ca-11e3-a07f-49ddc7417125_story.html
[5]: http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/nsa-report-on-privacy-violations-in-the-first-quarter-of-2012/395/ -
Keyboard Maestro Macro: Attach and Send
I’ve long had a need to take a file sitting on my computer and send to to someone. While you can do that with the share menu on OS X, it’s not that great for a couple of reasons:
1. It’s a menu item you have to click.
2. It doesn’t, and can’t, set simple things like the to, subject, bcc, and sending email account.Those are items I always need to change — so I’d like to be able to set those to a keyboard shortcut for faster sending of files. Additionally I have PDFs that I email monthly, to the same people, with just the date in the subject changing (and the PDF) — it’d be great to automate that too.

What I have come up with in Keyboard Maestro (hat tip to [this post from Viticci][1]) is a macro that does just that. More so than any of my other macros, this macro heavily relies on AppleScript to get the job done.
What this macro is doing is using Keyboard Maestro to pass variables to an AppleScript. I pass the date, because I simply couldn’t figure out how to get todays date formatted the way I wanted it in AppleScript. You will also notice a blank variable for the recipient email address — I use that in later macros and it was easier to keep in than remove.
The heart of the macro is this AppleScript:
([Download the script here](https://brooksreview.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/file-emailer.zip).)
At my office we BCC all communications to Highrise, and so you can see the address for that on the BCC line. I also set the sender in the AppleScript, but if you wanted to you could set that with a Keyboard Maestro variable just like I have for the recipient and subject lines.
With that all setup, and the basic macro in place, I just duplicated the macro for each group of people I wanted to send an email to. Pasted their address in the macro variable box for addresses, and modified the subject variable as needed.
In all I have 14 different file emailing macros. All stored in one group and activated with the same hotkey. You can select as many files as you want and they will all be attached — this saves me a ton of time each month.
[1]: http://www.macstories.net/tutorials/automating-mail-signatures-and-senders-with-applescript-and-keyboard-maestro/
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‘Shift the Evilness’
Peter Lewis, in response to my post about the Gmail scanning, has [two][1] fantastic [App.net posts][2], the latter of which ends:
> They both [U.S. Government and Google] think they are not being evil to learn absolutely everything, as long as they only use it for “good”. So they shift the evilness onto the use of the information rather than purely collecting…
That’s spot on.
[1]: https://alpha.app.net/peternlewis/post/9124661
[2]: https://alpha.app.net/peternlewis/post/9127531 -
‘Secure’ Email is the Wrong Approach
Email, by its very design, cannot be a truly secure system, so let’s stop trying to make “secure” email systems. In order for email to work, headers (recipients, subjects, from) need to be sent in the clear so that servers can route the email to the correct server — think of this data like the information on the outside of an envelope that you mail to someone. That’s all “publicly” readable information — [and telling][1].
Email, once sent, is bouncing around an awful lot, perhaps the most simple route being:
– From sender computer to sender email server
– From sender email server to receiver server
– From receiver server to receiver computerIn this very basic setup, that’s four places that your actual message is being stored, and three transmission legs. If any one of those points is not secure, then neither is the message. If any one of those legs is out of *your* control, then the encryption can be circumvented. And even *if* all those points *were* secure the NSA could still tell who was sending what message to whom (and what its subject was).
Above I linked to the rather [damning analysis][2] of “PRISM in the 18th Century”, the gist of which is (as written by Jason Kottke):
> In a [clever article][3], Kieran Healy uses only the membership lists of various Boston-area organizations in the late 1770s to find out quite a lot about who might be the leaders of the nascent revolutionary cell. Even with this simple analysis, Paul Revere’s name pops out of the data.
So even if you can hide the contents of your communications, the very information of who you are communicating with, how often, and when, is damning in itself.
So why is everyone so wrapped up in securing this current email system? My guess is because it’s what we have, but that’s like trying to find a faster horse, instead of inventing the car. We now need to invent the car, so to speak.
We need a secure, decentralized, communication system.
I look at the current email system in much the same way that Napster was designed at its peak: A system brought down by its own design. The centralization killed it. BitTorrent, on the other hand, is decentralized and much harder — perhaps even impossible — to shut down because there is no central switch to kill the whole the system.
Essentially we need the BitTorrent of email systems. I don’t mean sending messages over BitTorrent, I mean a modern system designed from the ground up for secure communications. There are systems out there that do this, for example Silent Circle’s text messaging system, which was designed to be secure from the outset (and allows file sharing). But Silent Circle’s system is proprietary. We need an open, standards-based system that tools can be built around for secure correspondence.
I don’t know how such a system would work, but it seems to me that trying to secure email is futile. Instead we should work to create a new secure communication system that, perhaps insecurely, is still backwards compatible with our current email systems.
Let’s not worry about making email secure. Instead, let’s make a new, entirely secure, system that just happens to work with the existing email infrastructure (albeit in an insecure manner).
[1]: http://kottke.org/13/06/prism-in-the-18th-century
[2]: http://kottke.org/13/06/prism-in-the-18th-century
[3]: http://kieranhealy.org/blog/archives/2013/06/09/using-metadata-to-find-paul-revere/ -
‘Google: Gmail Users Shouldn’t Expect Email Privacy’
[Dominic Rushe has published an article about Google’s response to a lawsuit][1]. The article paints the picture that Google has written a big “fuck you” to users, and thus has Google saying that users are stupid if they think their email *isn’t* being read, or in Google parlance “scanned”.
Instead of trusting Rushe’s article, here’s a few tidbits I pulled out of the [actual legal response][2]:
> These protections reflect the reality that ECS providers like Google must scan the emails sent to and from their systems as part of providing their services.
> Here, all Plaintiffs who are Gmail users consented to the automated scanning of their emails (including for purposes of delivering targeted advertising) in exchange for using the Gmail service, thus precluding any claim under federal law.
Nope, Rushe was right on the money. Not only does Google believe they have the right to scan all of your emails, but you consented to it by signing up for the service, even though you probably never read those terms.
I’ve been thinking about this a little bit with regard to Google’s *forgotten* “don’t be evil” mantra. I believe that Google very much believed in that statement when they started, but my question now is twofold:
1. Does Google still embrace that mantra?
2. If so, how do they reconcile that against statements quoted above?I think the answer to the first question is a resounding, YES. I very much believe that Google embraces the idea of not being evil.
So, how then does Google reconcile “don’t be evil” with the fact that they are scanning all emails for (more or less) the sole purpose of targeting ads? My best guess is that Google rocks itself to sleep at night citing the fact that the users agreed to this.
All the while knowing, that the users, never read that clause.
[1]: http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/aug/14/google-gmail-users-privacy-email-lawsuit
[2]: http://www.scribd.com/doc/160134104/Google-Motion-to-Dismiss-061313 -
Deserving Attention
[Adam Siegel writing about his not-yet-year-old daughter’s interactions with him][1]:
> In an almost unconscious habit whenever I have a short moment of free time in between tasks, I took the brief respite to pull out my phone and check my mail. 60 seconds later after reading a couple messages and deleting a few more, I looked up from the screen to see that Margot had stopped playing and was staring at me. “This is how it begins,” I thought. I’m showing her my screen deserves my attention at the moment more than she does.
My wife and I went through the same struggle, we still go through it daily, and I suspect that most parents are going through this too. Sure, when you are dating someone you keep your phone stashed, but back then phones also did less. And then you get married and, well, you are both on your phone watching TV and eating ice cream (like any good American). And then you have a kid and the habit of checking your phone is so much a part of your flow, that you don’t notice when you do it.
And then you look up.
And there’s your daughter, staring at you, not playing — just looking. It makes my heart sink a bit every time.
Then my daughter strides over, grabs my phone, unlocks it, and starts tapping on stuff. “Nooo, not that one…” ((True story, I had to set my iOS devices to require pass codes immediately.))
[1]: http://amsiegel.com/post/58170083617/i-am-being-watched
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Android Niceties
[This article][1], that I skimmed, sent me over to the [Android Niceties Tumblr][2], basically a site showing you screenshots of Android apps they think are beautiful. I guess this could easily be a post where you expect me to say “not even close to iOS”, but that’s not the case. There’s some really great looking apps collected here.
I’d even say this is an easier way to find good Android apps.
As has been noted by others before, the design divide between iOS and Android has closed — now the question is the revenue divide. iOS developers [still make substantially more money on average][3], so the question for me is whether that can change before the developers investing in good design give up on the platform.
At some point you have to make money to recoup the time input. I just don’t see ads cutting it, so will the paid Android app market mature, and uh, start paying?
[1]: http://paulstamatiou.com/android-is-better
[2]: http://androidniceties.tumblr.com/
[3]: http://www.forbes.com/sites/tristanlouis/2013/08/10/how-much-do-average-apps-make/ -
‘A Low Point in Barack Obama’s Presidency’
You know how idiots write stupid shit about Apple, and then an Apple writer will go section by section through the idiotic post and show how stupid, and verifiably false, the post is? You know what I am talking about. Well, [Conor Friedersdorf just did that for The Atlantic][1], except the target of his article is the PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, which might have been shocking a few months ago.
Friedersdorf concludes:
> The surveillance debate is arguably the most important of our era.
> Yet throughout the surveillance debate, the executive branch, including Obama, has lied, obfuscated, and misled the American people in a variety of ways. Before Edward Snowden’s leaks, they could at least tell themselves that the disinformation was serving the purpose of keeping al-Qaeda operates from learning the general contours of our surveillance capabilities. But today, when that excuse has long since expired, Obama is still lying, obfuscating, and misleading the American people. In doing so, he is preventing representative democracy from functioning as well as it might. With the stakes so high, and his performance so dubious in so many places, Friday’s speech has got to be one of the low points of his presidency.This is a long post by Friedersdorf, but truly fascinating to see the lies, half-truths, and weasel words coming out of the man *we* elected to lead us. Sickening, really.
[1]: http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/08/the-surveillance-speech-a-low-point-in-barack-obamas-presidency/278565/
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A Democracy Doesn’t Work if the Laws are Secret
Two interesting posts surrounding the greater NSA debate caught my eye recently. The first is [an Op-Ed in The LA Times by Andrew Liepman][1], titled “What did Edward Snowden get wrong? Everything”. Don’t be confused though (as easy it would be with that headline), because the article is *not* refuting the validity of the leaks that Snowden made, it is a refutation of how *necessary* those leaks were/are.
Here’s the resume that The La Times bills for Liepman: “Andrew Liepman, a senior analyst at Rand Corp., was a career CIA officer and is a former deputy director of the National Counterterrorism Center.” The gist of Liepman’s argument is:
> But the intelligence community — always a less sympathetic protagonist than a self-styled whistle-blower — actually has a good story to tell about how seriously the government takes privacy issues. We should tell it.
Liepman’s argument is probably true, as I highly doubt that people work for any three-lettered U.S. agency and don’t have a very patriotic sense about their duty and job. I highly doubt that these agents of the U.S., like their military brothers in arms, have any ill-will towards Americans in general — I truly believe they are out to do good and protect us. Liepman is over stepping though, I agree the claim should not be that these agency want to violate American rights, but I don’t agree that you can lump that as the larger “government”. The problem is not with the tactics used by these agencies, but the laws that allow for their use passed not by the agencies, but by the executive branch. ((There’s an argument to be made that the legislative branch is to blame, but nothing more than my guy says this is more of an executive branch strong arm, so I place blame there.))
More specifically, the problem is not PRISM or XKeyscore, the problem is that there was, and is, no open debate of the passing of the laws that allowed for these programs. The American people are not at odds with the NSA, CIA, FBI, DEA, etc, they are at odds with the idea that secret laws, secret debates, and secret opinions are now what passes for ‘democracy’.
[Which brings me to the second post on Techdirt][2] by former deputy chief of staff for Ron Wyden, Jennifer Hoelzer — Wyden being one of the largest critics of these secret laws. Hoezler’s post very much echoes my concerns:
> I think it’s understandably hard for the American people to trust the President when he says his Administration has the legal authority to conduct these surveillance programs when one of the few things that remains classified about these programs is the legal argument that the administration says gives the NSA the authority to conduct these programs.
Yes the collection, and analyzing of American records that the NSA and others are doing is simply outrageous — but even more outrageous is the sheer fact that our publicly *elected* President is so unwilling to share the legal basis, or even allow for debating, these programs with *all* elected officials — let along the public.
Again, from Hoelzer:
> That’s right, supporters of a full scale reauthorization of the FISA Amendments Act put out a press release explaining why this was a good thing, while explicitly barring the Senator who voted against the legislation from explaining his concerns.
*Democracy?*
[1]: http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-0811-liepman-snowden-and-classified-informat-20130811,0,2610260.story
[2]: http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130810/09240524136/jennifer-hoelzers-insiders-view-administrations-response-to-nsa-surveillance-leaks.shtml -
Time to Host Your Own Email?
One of the things that I’ve been asked about since the Snowden leaks, and especially since last night when two major “secure” email services shut down, is how do I host my email?
I host *my* email on my Mac mini server, and it’s quite a bit easier than you probably think, but likely not as secure as you think, and most certainly as much money as you think.
Let’s address these items separately so that you can get a good idea of whether or not you are still interested.
## 1: Cost
I have, and you can, most certainly host email on almost any web server that you get to host a blog. That, however, is not the server we are looking at, instead we are looking at hosting email on a Mac of some sort (which pretty much means a Mac mini) and this Mac not being in your home (you want a more stable internet/power connection than your home internet for hosting email). For that there are two companies that I can recommend: [Macminicolo.net][1] (my choice) and [Macminivault.com][2] (the choice of someone whom I respect).
To use either you need a Mac mini and can expect to spend about $50/month to have your Mac mini with either company. Both do rentals, but Macminicolo.net doesn’t offer rentals all the time (you need to catch them when they are promoting a special) and Macminivault.com looks like they rent year round.
Bottom line: if you want to use a Mac mini to host your email, in a professional data center, you are either coming out of pocket $700 plus $50/mo, or (roughly) $100/mo if you are renting. The smarter option is to buy a mini, but even *I* didn’t follow that advice.
## 2: Ease of Operation
Assuming the price hasn’t scared you off, the next thing to talk about is just how easy it is to setup a mini for hosting email. Once you install OS X Server, it is surprisingly easy — truly. In the most basic sense all you have to do is:
1. Enable the mail service in the Server app, and add your domain.
2. You go to your registrar/DNS provider and setup an MX record to point to your server.
3. You setup your email clients.All of that was in an app, not the terminal, with the trickiest part being the DNS record — but if you use a domain with any site you likely know how to do that bit. Again, that’s just a basic look, but it is truly not a complicated process for basic email hosting.
Thanks to the help of [Rusty Ross][3], I know a few more tricks that you *should* do. Those include:
– Have your host setup a reverse DNS that points from the server IP to the domain that you are using for the server.
– Setup an SPF record with your DNS provider (Microsoft, of all companies, [has a nice tool for that][4].)
– Purchase and install an SSL certificate. While you can self-sign one, you will get dialogs bitching about it unless you buy one.
– Tweak the SPAM settings in the Server app.
– Install [Roundcube][5] for pretty webmail (otherwise you won’t have webmail).There’s a lot of other options ((I want to [point out this command line tool][6] for syncing over IMAP email accounts.)) , but I think that’s a good jumping off point. Everything except Roundcube can be done in the Server app, or Safari windows. There’s nothing massively complicated.
## 3: Operations / How well does it work?
If you like the price, and the setup doesn’t scare you, then you probably want to know about the operation — how stable is it, SPAM, etc… I’ve been running it now for long enough, and with enough different email addresses, to say that it is really stable, works far better than Google Apps, or any other IMAP system I have setup, and has *less* SPAM. In fact, I get more false positives with this setup than I have before — which is both good and bad.
My email address is not only published on this site, but is also a link. It *should* get a lot of SPAM, but the server catches most of it. My iCloud email address? That gets the *most* SPAM.
Mac OS X Server stable, easy, and good with catching SPAM. In other words, it works quite well.
## 4: Security
Ok, now we get to the downside: security.
There are a few things to consider:
– The security of the transmission.
– The security of the storage of the email.
– The physical security of the server.You can easily have the mini run over SSL, which is about as good as it gets for IMAP based email. Additionally, Roundcube can be connected to over SSL — so there’s no concern here (well there is concern about SSL, but there’s no *greater* option that is easily implemented).
Since the email is being stored on your server, and assuming you use secure passwords, you can rest assured there’s no random employee of an email company prying into your mail database.
The server is also sitting in a data center, which is high security, but whomever is providing service to you, certainly has direct physical access to your server (and knows which one is yours).
The last bit is the toughest part.
Of course with a Mac, you can use FileVault 2 for entire disk encryption — but as anyone who has used FileVault 2 knows — if you restart your Mac you have to enter a password *before* the Mac will even boot OS X. That means you cannot enter the password via VNC or other services — which is potentially horrible.
I’ve never had my mini restart on it’s own, nor have I ever needed to power cycle the machine to restart it — all have been reboots that I have requested, which means that [this little tidbit][7] about `authrestart` is very helpful.
Authrestart is a command line tool that allows you a one-at-a-time restart of a Mac using FileVault 2. You run the command, enter your password, and the Mac starts back up and into OS X without prompting for the initial password. This is great 99% of the time, but what about if trouble strikes and you need to reboot without using that command?
For that scenario I asked Brian Stucki, of Macminicolo.net, what in the world you can do, he responded via email:
> If your machine were to crash and need rebooting then there is no way to do it remotely. The options here are either 1) you can send over your password and we can log in for you so the startup process can finish. Or two, we have a KVM over IP that customers can control but it needs to be manually connected to your machine and you would need to have java on your computer. (Related: The KVM over IP market could definitely use some updating)
Either way, there will be a wait to get the machine back up and running. Stucki also mentioned to me that he knows of people keeping their email databases in encrypted disk images — thus the server can be remotely managed as normal, but the database is still encrypted. I personally have no experience with that, but would imagine it is a bit of a pain in the ass setup.
## Hosting Your Own Email
While getting email up and running on a Mac using OS X Server is pretty easy, it bears a large upfront and/or monthly cost to operate, and offers little extra physical security over email services, unless you are willing to wrestle with your mini.
(I am damned happy with my Mac mini email setup, but I plan on looking into storing email data in an encrypted disk image.)
The bottom line for most people is: just find a better email host. If you use a server already (say for your blog) I really do think it is worth getting a Mac mini server — I wish I had done it years ago — and at that point, why not host your own email? ((If you get a Mac mini through Macminicolo.net, mentioning my name will get you nothing, and get me a small kickback — or so I am told in the FAQ.))
**UPDATE:** Some really good information [in this App.net thread on the matter](https://alpha.app.net/thomasbrand/post/8691643).
[1]: http://www.macminicolo.net
[2]: http://www.macminivault.com
[3]: https://twitter.com/ConsultantRR
[4]: http://www.microsoft.com/mscorp/safety/content/technologies/senderid/wizard/default.aspx
[5]: http://roundcube.net
[6]: http://imapsync.lamiral.info
[7]: http://blog.macminicolo.net/post/32419058726/restart-a-remote-mac-that-is-running-filevault-2 -
Quote of the Date: The New York Times Editorial Board
“Time and again, the N.S.A. has pushed past the limits that lawmakers thought they had imposed to prevent it from invading basic privacy, as guaranteed by the Constitution.” -
‘Google, Build Up This Wall’
[Stephen Hackett on the lack of security overview on Google Play (store?)][1]:
> In short, Craig Young, a researcher at security firm Tripwire, built an app that can steal weblogin tokens and pass them off to another server. Once there, they can be used in a non-Android browser to log in to users’ Google accounts without the actual passwords.
> Gmail, Google Drive, Google Calendar can all be accessed with these weblogin tokens, for regular Gmail users as well as Google Apps customers.The app apparently went up (is up?) for download. Hackett argues that at the very least Google needs to begin looking through the apps for security issues to protect users, while still allowing crazy apps through if they pass the security test, but if Google pulled all the insecure apps, what apps would be left?
[1]: http://512pixels.net/2013/08/google-build-up-this-wall/
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‘Firefox’ Complicated and Very Secure Way of Retrieving Passwords’
[Michiel Bijl shows the “complicated and very secure way” FireFox handles passwords][1]. I guess you are left with Safari if you are a Mac user… Though, I would be willing to forgive FireFox if they make Tor a standard part of their browser.
[1]: https://alpha.app.net/michielbijl/post/8679197
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Snowden on Lavabit
[Edward Snowden commenting on the Lavabit shutdown, via Glenn Greenwald at The Gaurdian][1]:
> America cannot succeed as a country where individuals like Mr. Levison have to relocate their businesses abroad to be successful. Employees and leaders at Google, Facebook, Microsoft, Yahoo, Apple, and the rest of our internet titans must ask themselves why they aren’t fighting for our interests the same way small businesses are. The defense they have offered to this point is that they were compelled by laws they do not agree with, but one day of downtime for the coalition of their services could achieve what a hundred Lavabits could not.
That would be a hell of a thing, no Google, Facebook, Microsoft, Yahoo, or Apple until the US government pulls their heads out of their asses. If those companies simply tell their users they are shutting down until something is done, you better believe shit *will* get done. I’d pay to see that.
[1]: http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/aug/09/lavabit-shutdown-snowden-silicon-valley
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Silent Circle Also Shuts Down
[Jon Callas on the Silent Circle blog][1]:
> Today, another secure email provider, Lavabit, shut down their system lest they “be complicit in crimes against the American people.” We see the writing the wall, and we have decided that it is best for us to shut down Silent Mail now. We have not received subpoenas, warrants, security letters, or anything else by any government, and this is why we are acting now.
I signed up for Silent Circle a little while back, and added that email address to the contact page of this site. In doing so I simply stated that it was “slightly more secure email” as it’s not really a secure option. Interestingly, among commenters that had never contacted me before, they chose to use the Silent Circle email 3 to 1.
I respect why Lavabit shut down, they were facing a court order that they felt they could not morally comply with — in an effort to keep users safe they stopped the service. That makes sense, but they likely can’t destroy the data they have, unless they want to go to prison for destroying evidence — they will have to fight for that. (I am guessing.)
Silent Circle though is a different story, they did this preemptively before a court order came to them. Thus, as [The New York Times reports][2], they were able to destroy their email servers:
> Mike Janke, Silent Circle’s chief executive, said in a telephone interview late Thursday that his company had destroyed its server. “Gone. Can’t get it back. Nobody can,” he said. “We thought it was better to take flak from customers than be forced to turn it over.”
The shitty part about both of these services going down is that the data is gone too. Users didn’t have a chance to migrate because if either company gave them chance they would have tipped their hand and the government would have been able to legally compel them not to shut down (let alone destroy data). These services had to end abruptly to protect their users. No way around that.
Still, I paid for a year of service for Silent Circle, and a large part of that was for the email. I’ve asked for a partial refund to reflect the partial (and immediate) closure of the service that Silent Circle charged me for, and am concerned that these refunds weren’t automatic as part of the announcement — that doesn’t seem very consumer friendly.
[1]: http://silentcircle.wordpress.com/2013/08/09/to-our-customers/
[2]: http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/08/08/two-providers-of-encrypted-e-mail-shut-down/?_r=0 -
Lavabit Shuts Down
[The site has been replaced with a splash page][1], which starts:
> I have been forced to make a difficult decision: to become complicit in crimes against the American people or walk away from nearly ten years of hard work by shutting down Lavabit. After significant soul searching, I have decided to suspend operations.
Lavabit was an encrypted and private email service that I had previously written about. It’s main competitor seems to be HushMail — which has been known to turn over records when compelled to do so (but it is tough for the US to get those because the US must ask Canada to compel HushMail). I hope this works out for Lavabit — I wasn’t a huge fan of their service, but this is a shitty way to treat businesses.
**UPDATE**: It seems fair to draw the conclusion that this may have to do with the fact that Edward Snowden purportedly used Lavabit, per [this article on Global Post](http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/europe/russia/130712/edward-snowden-meeting-moscow-airport):
> The note, which could not be verified, requested the attendance of a slew of well-known rights workers and lawyers “for a brief statement and discussion regarding the next steps forward in my situation,” according to a copy of the invitation posted Lokshina.
> It was sent from the email address “edsnowden@lavabit.com,” according to Lokshina’s post, and signed “Edward Joseph Snowden.”
I do want to mention that I suspect that if Snowden did use Lavabit it was so that he could send slightly more secure email communications to journalists who were not using PGP. Lavabit correspondence (as I understand it) is encrypted if sent between Lavabit accounts. Sending to a non-Lavabit account helps because the transmission from the client (or web interface) would be encrypted, and only unencrypted once it left Lavabit servers to reach the recipient servers. That means that Snowden’s location details and other such goodies would have been masked (I am guessing), but the email not encrypted — again, with my knowledge of how the service *did* work.
It seems logical that if the reporting is true, that the U.S. would demand access to the Lavabit servers for that information, knowing the information would likely not be anything useful. Which is just even more frustrating given that it effectively forced Lavabit to close down.
(via [Jan Dusek on App.net][2])
[1]: http://lavabit.com/
[2]: https://alpha.app.net/dusek/post/8643134
